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It is well known that unconditional security of quantum key distribution(QKD) can be guaranteed
by quantum mechanics. However, the practical QKD systems have some imperfections, which can be
controlled by the eavesdropper to attack the secret key. With the current experimental technology,
the realistic beam splitter, made by the fused biconical technology, has wavelength dependent prop-
erty. Based on this fatal security loophole, we propose wavelength-dependent attacking protocol,
which can be applied to all practical QKD systems with the passive state modulation. Moreover,
we experimentally attack practical polarization encoding QKD system to get all the secret key
information at the cost of only increasing quantum bit error rate from 1.3% to 1.4%.
Quantum key distribution is the art of sharing secret
keys between two distant parties Alice and Bob. Since
the BB84 protocol has been proposed by Bennet and
Brassard [1], the unconditional security of QKD protocol
has attracted much attentions. Lo and Chau [2] proved
unconditional security of BB84 protocol with quantum
computer. Shor and Preskill [3] proved unconditional se-
curity of BB84 protocol by applying the entanglement
distillation and purification (EDP) technology. More re-
cently, Renner [4] proved unconditional security of BB84
protocol by applying the quantum information theory
method.
Whereas, security analysis model based on the perfect
QKD protocol can not be directly applied to the practi-
cal QKD systems [5–7], Gottesman, Lo, Lukenhaus and
Preskill [8] analyzed security of the practical QKD sys-
tem and gave the famous secret key rate formula GLLP.
Combining their security analysis result with decoy state
method [9–11], practical QKD system can be realized
with weak coherent source. But their security analysis
can not be applied to the practical QKD system with ar-
bitrary imperfections [12, 13], which may introduce side
channel attacks. Imperfect phase modulator introducing
phase-remapping attack has been experimentally demon-
strated [14]. Imperfect single photon detector (SPD)
introducing detector blinding attack has also been pro-
posed in Ref. [15], they demonstrated that imperfect
SPD can be fully remote-controlled by utilizing specially
tailored bright illumination. More recently, dead time
attack with imperfect SPD has been proposed in Ref.
[16], in which the eavesdropper can exploit the dead time
effect of the imperfect SPD to gain almost full secret
information without being discovered. Jain et al. [17]
have proved that inappropriately implemented calibra-
tion routine will introduce a fatal security loophole. All
these results demonstrate that practical QKD device im-
perfections can lead to various types of attacks [18–23].
In current experimental realizations, beam splitter has
the wavelength dependent property. Based on this im-
perfection, we propose a new type of attacking protocol.
Our experimental demonstration shows that this strat-
egy can effectively attack practical passive modulated
polarization based QKD system without being discov-
ered, where passive(active) modulation implies that Bob
passively(actively) select measurement bases. It should
be noted that the attacking model can also be easily gen-
eralized to other passive modulated QKD systems.
Practical QKD systems can be divided into phase en-
coded and polarization encoded respectively. In the po-
larization based QKD systems [24, 25], Bob passively se-
lects the measurement basis by the BS for convenient and
high speed modulation. More precisely, the 1× 2 BS has
one input port and two output ports (port 1 and port
2), Bob can choose to measure the photon state either
in rectilinear basis if it pass through output port 1, or
in diagonal basis if it pass through output port 2. In
the perfect case, the single photon state will randomly
select to pass through one output port of the BS. But,
the realistic BS is commonly made by the fused biconical
taper (FBT) technology [26], the coupling ratio of the
FBT BS is generally wavelength-dependent. We made
a BS with FBT technology in our experimental realiza-
tion, and found that the coupling ratio is 0.5 in the 1550
nm wavelength, while the 1470 nm and 1290 nm source
have the coupling ratio 0.986 and 0.003 respectively. In-
terestingly, we can apply the 1470 nm (1290 nm) source
to control the selection of the rectilinear basis (diago-
nal basis) in Bob’s side. Using this loophole, we present
that Eve can control Bob’s measurement basis choice re-
motely at the cost of only increasing quantum bit error
rate(QBER) from 1.3% to 1.4%.
The FBT BS is made by closing two or more bare
optical fibers, fusing them in a high temperature envi-
ronment and drawing their two ends at the same time,
then a specific biconic tapered waveguide structure can
be formed in the heating area. The FBT BS can be
used as the splitter or the coupler, it has the feature
of low insertion loss, good directivity and low cost, so
2many of the commercial BS products are made by this
technology. However, coupling ratio of the FBT BS is
wavelength-dependent, and most types of the FBT BS
work only in a limited range of wavelength (limited band-
width), where the coupling ratio of the BS is defined as
r =
Iport1
Iport1+Iport2
, Iport1 (Iport2) is output light intensity
from BS’s output port 1 (output port 2). Typical cou-
pling ratio at the center wavelength provides optimal per-
formance, but the coupling ratio varies periodically with
wavelength changes. We made a BS with FBT technol-
ogy in our experimental realization, and found that it
has distinguishing wavelength-dependent characteristic,
detailed expression of this property can be given in Fig.
1.
FIG. 1: The relationship between wavelength of the source
and the coupling ratio, here the red dot is the practical exper-
imental result, the red line is the theoretical analysis result.
The right side is the single wave length fiber coupler made by
the Newport Corporation [27], the coupling ratio of which are
also wavelength-dependent.
We analyze the relationship between wavelength λ and
coupling ratio r by using the coupling model given in Ref.
[28, 29]:
r = F 2sin2(Cw
F
), (1)
where F 2 is the maximal power that is coupled, C ∝ λ2.5
is the coupling coefficient, w is the heat source width.
From Fig. 1, we can find that the realistic BS has the
perfect coupling ratio 0.5 with 1550 nm laser diode (LD),
in which case the BS can be regarded as perfect QKD de-
vice. When we test it with 1290nm LD and 1470nm LD,
the coupling ratio changed to be 0.003 and 0.986, which
means that the 1290 nm and 1470 nm LD will mainly pass
through BS’s port 2 and prot 1 respectively. Thus the
realistic BS can not be regarded as perfect QKD device
in case of wavelength of the LD is not 1550 nm. Com-
bining this imperfection with multi wavelength sources,
we show that Eve can acquire all secret key information
in Bob’s side with very low cost [30].
The polarization based QKD system with passive state
modulation can be depicted precisely in Fig. 2. After
FIG. 2: Schematic diagram of the polarization based QKD
system, where 1550 LD means Alice send the quantum state
with the 1550 nm source, BS is the beam splitter, PBS is the
polarization beam splitter, IM is the intensity modulator, PC
is the polarization controller, ATT is the attenuator, SPD is
the single photon detector.
two cascaded BS with an additional intensity modula-
tion, four polarization states can be generated by 1550
nm LD. More precisely, when Alice want to transmit
the prepared quantum state, the positive voltage will be
added on the matched IM, and the negative voltage will
be added on the other IM respectively. Thus only the sin-
gle photon state modulated by the positive voltage can
be transmitted into the quantum channel. In the ideal
polarization based QKD experimental realization, one of
the basic assumption is that the photon state will pass
through each output side with 50% probability. Actu-
ally, this perfect BS in Bob’s side can be regarded as
the random bases selector. Unfortunately, the coupling
ratio of the realistic FBT BS is wavelength-dependent
as illustrated in the previous section. Eve can adopt
intercept-and-resend strategy to attack practical polar-
ization based QKD systems, where Eve’s detection setup
in the quantum channel is the same as Bob’s side. Ap-
plying her state measurement result, Eve will send the
remodulated photon state to Bob. In this attacking pro-
tocol, the main difficult for Eve is to find the appropriate
LD with wavelengths λ1 and λ2, where λ1 LD has the
coupling ratio r1 > 0.5, λ2 LD has the coupling ratio
r2 < 0.5. To attack the practical QKD system, Eve will
send the re-modulated quantum state with λ1 (λ2) LD
to Bob, if she can get the detection result with the recti-
linear basis {0o, 90o} (diagonal basis {45o, 135o}).
We initially give the security analysis in the theoretical
aspect under the assumption that only the BS in QKD
system is imperfect. By considering intercept-and-resend
strategy has been applied by Eve in the quantum channel,
the final QBER between Alice and Bob can be given by
Err = 14 (
1−r1
2−(r1+r2) +
r2
r1+r2
), (2)
this equation can be simply calculated with the proba-
bility tree of the state transformation as illustrated in
3FIG. 3: Probability tree of the state transformation. Alice
sends the modulated quantum sate to the quantum chan-
nel, Eve gets the state detection result with probability
p1 ∈ {0.25, 0.25, 0.5} in the middle stage, Bob saves his sate
detection result after the sifting protocol with probability
p2 ∈ {
1
2
r1 +
1
4
r2,
1
4
r2} or {
1
2
(1 − r2) +
1
4
(1 − r1),
1
4
(1 − r1)}
with different measurement bases.
Fig. 3. Utilizing Shor and Preskill’s security analysis
result with the perfect QKD [3], Alice and Bob can dis-
till the final secret key if the QBER introduced by the
eavesdropper is lower than 11%. In case of the cou-
pling ration and the wavelength have a strong correla-
tion (r1 → 1, r2 → 0), Eve can get full secret key bit
even if the error rate is lower [31]. We note that no se-
cret key can be established if the error rate is lower than
Err between two legitimate parties. More interestingly,
even zero QBER can not generate any secret key with
full wavelength dependent BS (r1 = 1, r2 = 0).
By using the analyzed realistic BS in the previous sec-
tion, detailed setup of the attacking system can be illus-
trated in Fig. 4. In this system, if Eve get the measure-
FIG. 4: Attacking practical polarization based QKD system.
The red area is controlled by the eavesdropper Eve, who
will utilize the intercept-and-resend strategy by applying the
wavelength-dependent BS and multi-wavelength sources.
ment result 0 (1) with the rectilinear basis {0o, 90o}, she
will prepare the quantum state |0o〉 (|90o〉) again with the
1470 nm LD. Conversely, if she can get the detection re-
sult 0 (1) with the diagonal basis {45o, 135o}, she will pre-
pare the quantum state |45o〉 (|135o〉) again with the 1290
nm laser diode, where |45o〉 = 1√
2
(|0o〉+ |90o〉), |135o〉 =
− 1√
2
(|0o〉 − |90o〉). We give a simple example that Alice
sends the quantum sate |0o〉, and Eve gets the detection
result |0o〉 in the rectilinear basis {0o, 90o} with proba-
bility 50%, then she will send the remodulated 1470 nm
laser to the receiver Bob, since the 1470 nm laser can
mainly pass through the port 1 of the BS in Bob’s side,
Bob can detect |0o〉 in the rectilinear basis with 98.6%
success probability. If Eve get the detection result in
the diagonal basis {45o, 135o} with the probability 50%,
then she will send the remodulated 1290 nm laser to the
receiver Bob, since the 1290 nm laser can mainly pass
trough the port 2 of the BS in Bob’s side, Bob can get
the detection result in the diagonal basis with 99.7% suc-
cess probability. Note that the detection efficiency of the
practical SPD is also wavelength-dependent, we verified
that the id 200 SPD [32] has detection efficiency 12.1%,
10.7% and 5.0% by considering wavelengths of the source
are 1550 nm, 1470 nm and 1290 nm respectively. To solve
this problem, we will add different attenuations after the
1470 nm LD and 1290 nm LD, thus Bob can get the
similar detection result in case of with and without the
eavesdropper.
Following the attacking model given in the previ-
ous section, we give the photon count result in Bob’s
side by considering two cases: without the eavesdrop-
per and with the eavesdropper respectively. In the
first case, Alice randomly send the polarization state
{|0o〉, |90o〉, |45o〉, |135o〉} to the quantum channel. Con-
sidering the practical single photon detection efficiency
is 12.1% in 1550 nm case, we can get about 1% effective
detection result in case of the quantum channel has 10.79
dB attenuation. In our practical experimental realization
without the eavesdropper, Alice send 106 prepared quan-
tum states, then Bob get about 104 detection results,
which can be illustrated precisely in Fig. 5.
In case of with the eavesdropper, Eve will apply the
similar detection setup, but the channel attenuation be-
tween Alice and Eve is 0 dB, the reason for which is that
Eve can utilize the lossless channel instead of the stan-
dard optical fiber. We give the detection result in Bob’s
side by considering Eve send 5 × 103 modulated quan-
tum states (each pulse has two photons on average) to
the quantum channel, the channel loss between Eve and
Bob is 3.3 dB and 0 dB in 1470 nm and 1290 nm cases
respectively, then Bob can get about 5 × 103 effective
detection results, detailed detection results can be illus-
trated in Fig. 6. Comparing different types of detection
results, we find that Eve can remotely control Bob’s basis
selection only by changing LD’s wavelengths.
Based on this strategy, polarization based QKD system
has been attacked in our practical experimental realiza-
tion. Bob gets the similar detection result in case of with
and without the eavesdropper. Similarly, the QBER be-
tween Alice and Bob only increases from 1.3% to 1.4%,
thus Eve can get almost all of the secret key information
without being discovered.
In conclusion, we propose a new type of strategy to at-
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FIG. 5: The detection result in Bob’s side without
the eavesdropper Eve. Alice sends four quantum states
{|0o〉, |90o〉, |45o〉, |135o〉} to the quantum channel with 1550
nm LD, In Bob’s side, he can get the correct detection result if
the matched basis has been chosen. He will get the detection
result with 50% error rate if the unmatched basis has been
chosen correspondingly.
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FIG. 6: The detection result in Bob’s side with the eaves-
dropper. Eve sends quantum states {|0o〉, |90o〉} with 1470
nm LD, sends quantum states {|45o〉, |135o〉} with 1290 nm
LD to the quantum channel. In Bob’s side, he can only get
the detection result in the rectilinear basis when the 1470 nm
laser has been detected. Similarly, he can only get the detec-
tion result in the diagonal basis when the 1290 nm laser has
been detected.
tack the practical polarization based QKD system by us-
ing the wavelength-dependent BS and multi-wavelength
sources. The eavesdropper Eve can control Bob’s mea-
surement basis with 100% success probability without
reducing the receiver’s expected detection rate or signif-
icantly increasing the bit error rate. Our result demon-
strate that all practical devices require security inspec-
tion for avoiding side channel attacks in practical QKD
experimental realizations. We note that this attacking
protocol can not be avoided even if the wavelength filter
was applied in Bob’s side, since Eve only need increase
the intensity of the light to attack Bob’s detection setup.
Meanwhile, we should also note that this attacking pro-
tocol can be avoided effectively by applying the actively
modulated phase encoding QKD systems [33–35].
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